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 This article revisits our administrative law journey since the Second World War (1939-1945).  It is a 
journey worth recounting because it reveals how starkly our administrative law has changed over a 
short, finite period of time.  The transformative nature of this change beguiled some into believing 
that judicial review was a strictly post-war phenomenon.  This was palpably not so; judicial review 
has an absorbing history reaching back to the early jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench.1 
 
This article critiques nine judicially-constructed dichotomies that dominated administrative law 
following the war.  These dichotomies were fixed and unforgiving, portraying administrative law as 
rigorous and analytical.  They lent respectability to a subject that naturally spawned suspicion.  
Senior judges denounced the subject as “Continental jargon”2 and the work of “academicians”.3  The 
irony is that the dichotomies employed to invigorate the subject were transparently false.  They 
stultified administrative law reasoning and checked the courts’ ability to be effective purveyors of 
public accountability.4   
 
 
* Parts of this article were based on a seminar, “Our Post-war Public Law Journey”, presented to the Centre for 
Public Law, University of Cambridge, 21 November 2013. 
 
1 Sir Geoffrey Cross (ed) Radcliffe and Cross The English Legal System (4th ed, Butterworths, London, 1964) at 
59-60. 
2 Lord Hewart of Bury Not Without Prejudice (National Book Association, London, 1937) at 202ff.  See PA 
Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2014) at 
855-856 (“Joseph”).  
2 Sir Michael Myers Journal of Public Administration (NZ), Vol 3, No 2 at 41.  See JL Robson and KJ Scott, “Public 
Administration and Administrative Law” in JL Robson (ed) New Zealand: The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution (Stevens & Sons, London, 1954) 84 at 90.      
2 For acknowledgement of the accountability role of the courts, see Peters v Davison [1992] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 
188; Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC) at 388; Videbeck v 
Auckland City Council [2002] 3 NZLR 842 (HC) at 850; Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 690 (CA) at 








From the mid-1960s, a cautious optimism swept administrative law.  The courts carefully began 
unpicking the dichotomies and recasting administrative law principles in direct, accessible language.  
The courts, de Smith enthused, were “abandoning servitude to their own concepts and asserting 
mastery over them”.5  This process took a full two decades to complete but the transformation 
marked a new era in administrative law.  The transition was from complex, formalist legal principles 
to an evaluative, contextual approach in judicial review.  The subtitle to this article, “From there to 
here”, caricatures this transition.    
 
The following critiques the post-war dichotomies and fast-forwards to the present day.  A charcoal 
sketch of judicial review provides a fitting end-point against which to record the transformative 
change that marked this period.  The article ends on a slightly pessimistic note: the need to remain 
ever-vigilant against retrogressive developments in administrative law.   
 
B Post-war administrative law pedagogy 
 
(i) Binary judicial method  
 
The doctrinal complexity of administrative law following the war was extraordinary.  Nine 
dichotomies posited binary choices in judicial review.6  A case either fell into category X, or it fell into 
category Y.  There was nothing between:  it was classic “either”/ “or” doctrine.  How the court 
categorised the case predetermined the outcome.  If a court ruled an administrative error 
jurisdictional, the applicant succeeded.  But if it ruled the error non-jurisdictional, the applicant 
failed.  Only jurisdictional error triggered the ultra vires doctrine.  Each of the dichotomies operated 
so as to select the applicable administrative law principle, which ipso facto determined the outcome 
of the case.  By the end of the 1970s, it was dawning on the courts that these dichotomies were 
“misleading”, “not easily fitted to the requirements of administrative law”.7  These had forced courts 
to cramp cases into rigid legal categories – categories that were “mutually exclusive and starkly 
 
5 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 77. 
6 There were ten dichotomies if one adds the decision/non-decision distinction.  This dichotomy is implicit in 
the legal rights versus non-legal interests distinction discussed below.  Interference with anything less than a 
legally recognised right was non-reviewable, which meant there had to be a decision in order to affect rights in 
a legally definitive sense.     
7 London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189. 
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contrasted”, “invented by lawyers for the purpose of convenient exposition”.8  The following 
commentary addresses each of the dichotomies. 
 
(ii) Jurisdictional error v non-jurisdictional error 
 
Many will recount the bruising debate from the mid-1990s over whether the ultra vires doctrine was 
the constitutional basis of judicial review.9  That debate was constructive because it forged a 
consensus that judicial review was sourced in the common law, flowing from the historical 
jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench to superintend inferior courts and tribunals.  However, not 
always did that view prevail.  In its heyday, the doctrine of ultra vires was the “start” and “end” 
points of judicial review.  The doctrine focused on the limits of the decision-making power 
Parliament had conferred. Had the decision-maker exceeded those limits and committed a 
jurisdictional error?  Jurisdiction meant “authority to decide”,10 which left decision-makers a licence 
to err.  Errors deemed non-jurisdictional were non-reviewable.   
 
The origins of the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error can be traced to the 
17th century decisions of the Court of King’s Bench.  De Smith observed that the “essential features” 
of this distinction survived into the mid-20th century so as to fix the scope of judicial review.11  But 
the distinction was far from self-evident.   The trick was distinguishing between the two types of 
error.  Whether or not a decision-maker had jurisdiction was determined as a threshold issue, “at 
the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry”.12  If there was jurisdiction at the outset, 
errors made in the course of an inquiry were non-jurisdictional.  Errors on questions of law or fact 
that the decision-maker was authorised to make did not expose the decision to challenge.   
 
Judicial review was a lottery.  Categorising the error predetermined the outcome.  What made some 
errors jurisdictional and others not?  The problem, de Smith lamented, was one of public policy, not 
logic.13  The celebrated decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic v Foreign Compensation 
 
8 London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189-190. 
9 Much of that debate is recorded in CE Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (OUP, Oxford, 2000).  
See also CF Forsyth “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and 
Judicial Review” (1996) 55 CLJ 122; MC Elliot The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2001); PA Joseph “The Demise of Ultra Vires – Judicial Review in the New Zealand Courts” 
[2001] PL 354.    
10 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 96. 
11 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 81.  
12 R v Bolton (1841) 1 QB 66, 74. 
13 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 98. 
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Commission14 exacerbated matters: their Lordships scotched the only discernible distinction 
between the two types of error.  They rejected the threshold principle that jurisdiction was 
determinable only at the outset of an inquiry and not in the course of it.  A decision-maker might 
properly enter upon an authorised inquiry but nevertheless exceed its jurisdiction: it might promote 
an unauthorised purpose, breach the requirements of natural justice, apply a wrong legal test, or fail 
to take into account relevant considerations or take into account legally irrelevant ones.   
 
Anisminic is lauded as one of the great administrative law decisions of the 20th century.  Yet, it 
created an insurmountable problem.  Having established that jurisdictional error might occur in the 
course of an inquiry properly commenced, their Lordships affirmed that decision-makers still 
retained their licence to err within the limits of their jurisdiction (that is, to make non-jurisdictional 
errors).  So, which intra-inquiry errors were jurisdictional, and which errors were not?  The courts 
had dug themselves into a hole from which it took many years to recover.  After much hand ringing, 
they jettisoned the concept of jurisdictional error in favour of a broad remit to review material 
errors of law.  Today, the concept plays no role in affixing the scope of judicial review: the question 
whether or not an error was jurisdictional is relegated to history.15   
 
(iii) Judicial v administrative  
 
In The King v Electricity Commissioners,16 Atkin LJ (as he then was) made a pronouncement that was 
accorded greater authority than it warranted.  Certiorari and prohibition might issue, he said:17  
 
 “… whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting 
the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal 
authority.”                           
 
This pronouncement acquired canonical status, until the House of Lords revisited it in Ridge v 
Baldwin.18  Atkin LJ’s dictum constrained the reach of judicial review in two ways: this section 
identifies the first constraint and the section following identifies the second constraint. 
 
14 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) (per Lord Reid, Lord Pearce and Lord 
Wilberforce, Lord Morris and Lord Pearson dissenting). 
15 Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 181 (discussed below corresponding to nn 115-118).  Contrast 
the position in Australia where jurisdictional error remains the focus of judicial review: see M Aronson and M 
Groves Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, Law Book Company, Sydney, 2013) at [1.50], [2.30].    
16 The King v Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 KB 171 (CA) at 204-205. 
17 The King v Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 KB 171 (CA) at 204-205. 




For Atkin LJ, judicial review for breach of natural justice was restricted to decision-makers that were 
under a “duty to act judicially”.  Judicial (or quasi-judicial) functions were distinguished from 
administrative functions, which could not be reached through judicial review.  Injury to private 
interests in the exercise of administrative functions was non-justiciable.19  But classifying judicial and 
administrative functions was problematic: how were courts to differentiate when decision-makers of 
every hue operated as administrative functionaries in administrative settings?  De Smith despaired 
that it was “sometimes impossible” to discern why a court characterised a particular function as 
judicial or administrative.20  He acknowledged what many had suspected: that the court’s 
characterisation was often “a contrivance to support a conclusion reached on non-conceptual 
grounds”.  In other cases, the terms “judicial” and “administrative” were used loosely without any 
apparent deliberation,21 although the choice of label effectively decided the case.  This was, 
reflected one commentator, a “highly acrobatic part of the law”.22 
 
The criteria the courts applied were threefold: conclusiveness, trappings and procedure, and 
interpretation and declaration.  First, a body acting judicially typically issued orders that were 
binding and conclusive, without need of confirmation by another authority.  Such bodies were 
distinguished from ones exercising powers of an advisory,23 deliberative,24 preliminary,25 
investigatory26 or conciliatory27 character.  Secondly, a power of a judicial character usually entailed 
formal and procedural attributes that resembled the trappings of courts.  Such attributes included: 
disputes inter partes, hearings in public, power to compel witnesses and conduct examination on 
oath, duty to comply with rules of evidence, power to impose sanctions, and power to enforce 
obedience to orders.  Thirdly, the exercise of judicial power typically involved resolving disputed 
questions of law or fact by reference to pre-existing rules or objective standards. 
 
 
19 R v Leman Street Police Station Inspector, ex parte Venicoff [1920] 3 KB 72; R v Brixton Prison, ex parte 
Soblen [1963] 2 QB 243. 
20 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 58. 
21 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 58. 
22 J Willis “Administrative Law and the British North America Act” (1940) 53 Harv L Rev 251 at 281. 
23 Re Clifford and O’Sullivan [1921] 2 AC 570; R v MacFarlane, ex parte O’Flanagan and O’Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 
518 (HCA).  
24 R v Legislative Committee of the Church of Assembly, ex parte Haynes-Smith [1928] 1 KB 411.  
25 Jayawardene v Silva [1970] 1 WLR 1365. 
26 Hearts of Oak Assurance Co v Attorney-General [1932] AC 392; O’Connor v Waldron [1935] AC 76; Lockwood 
v Commonwealth (1954) 90 CLR 177 (HCA). 
27 Ayriss (FF) & Co v Alberta Labour Relations Board (1960) 23 DLR (2d) 584; R v Clipsham, ex parte Basken 
(1965) 49 DLR (2d) 747. 
6 
 
The courts juggled the criteria as best they could, sometimes engaging in analytical and verbal 
contortions.  None of the supposed criteria was conclusive, and some applied more strictly in some 
cases than others.  Judgments were often “singularly deficient in conceptual analysis”, and the 
“variations in linguistic usage … spectacular and frequently puzzling”.28  De Smith concluded: “At this 
point terminological and conceptual problems may appear to be overwhelming.”29  As of 1973, he 
took solace that the courts were finally acknowledging the mess they had created.30  In Ridge v 
Baldwin,31 the House of Lords conceded the unworkability of the judicial/administrative dichotomy.  
Lord Reid disavowed any “superadded” duty to act judicially in order to trigger the requirements of 
natural justice.  The rules applied, howsoever the power was categorised (judicial, administrative or 
otherwise).  It sufficed that the exercise of public power affected private rights or interests.32   
 
No attempt is made today to categorise the nature of the power exercised.33  Under the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972, it is no bar to relief that the respondent was not under a duty to act 
judicially.34  Earlier High Court Rules continued to refer to the duty but this was viewed as an 
omission through failure to delete.  The revised High Court Rules omit all reference to the duty.   
 
(iv) Legal rights v non-legal interests 
 
 In Electricity Commissioners Atkin LJ spoke of legal authority “to determine questions affecting the 
rights of subjects”.35  This established another formulaic restraint: only decisions affecting legally 
recognised rights were reviewable.  Interests not legally recognised within the Hohfeldian matrix 
lacked judicial protection.36   
 
Where did the interests of justice lie?  Should a person who was seriously disadvantaged by a public 
decision, who could assert no legally enforceable right, be disentitled to relief?  The doctrinal 
formalism of the law worked an injustice that had to be addressed.  In Schmidt v Secretary of State 
 
28 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 77. 
29 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 77. 
30 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 77. 
31 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL). 
32 Re HK [1967] 2 QB 617. 
33 See for example Combined Beneficiaries Union Inc v Auckland City COGS Committee [2008] NZCA 423, [2009] 
2 NZLR 56 at [11], [17], [25] and [26]. 
34 Judicature Amendment Act 1972, 3 4(2). 
35 The King v Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 KB 171 (CA) at 204-205. 




for Home Affairs,37 Lord Denning MR coined the expression “legitimate expectation” to escape 
Atkin’s constraint and extend the reach of judicial review.  The concept of legitimate expectation 
broadened the range of protectable interests beyond legally enforceable rights, and provided a 
much needed fillip for judicial review.    
 
Judicial review today is not confined to the protection of private rights in the Hohfeldian sense (legal 
rights balanced by correlative legal duties).  Interlocutory decisions are fully amenable to review, 
although they precede a final determination affecting rights.38  Judicial review may lie to review the 
grant or refusal of a licence (a privilege, not a right),39 or an inquiry whose functions are investigative 
and recommendatory only,40 or a decision not entailing or affecting any legal rights.  In Attorney-
General (Hong Kong) v Ng Yuen Shiu,41 certiorari quashed a removal order against an illegal 
immigrant who had no legal entitlement.  The immigration authorities had reneged on a public 
undertaking that illegal immigrants who presented themselves to the authorities would be dealt 
with fairly.  The applicant’s only “interest” was a legitimate expectation that his case would be fairly 
considered on its merits.  The Judicature Amendment Act 1972 codifies the common law position for 
the review of the exercise of statutory powers.   The terms “statutory power” and “statutory power 
of decision” mean a power to inquire into or make a decision affecting (a) “[t]he rights, powers, 
privileges, immunities, duties, or liabilities of any person”, or (b) “[t]he eligibility of any person to 
receive, or to continue to receive, a benefit or a licence, whether he is legally entitled to it or not”.42 
 
(v) Statutory power v prerogative power  
 
The distinction between statutory and prerogative powers engaged a dichotomy having an enviable 
historical lineage.  Throughout the ages, the courts distinguished the royal prerogative from 
discretionary statutory powers, and disavowed a general power to control the former.  They claimed 
jurisdiction to determine the existence and scope of the prerogative but refused to review its 
 
37 Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 (CA). 
38 Fay, Richwhite & Co Ltd v Davison [1995] 1 NZLR 517 (CA) at 524; Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 
183; Zaoui v Attorney-General [2004] 2 NZLR 339 (HC) at 360-361; Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] 1 
NZLR 690 (CA) at 720.   
39 R v Woodhouse [1906] 2 KIB 501 (CA); R v Brighton Borough Justices, ex parte Jarvis [1954] 1 WLR 203 (DC) 
(liquor licences); R v Liverpool Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 
299 (CA) (taxi licences); R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Hook [1976] 1 WLR 1052 (CA) 
(street trader’s licence).   
40 Re Erebus Royal Commission [1983] NZLR 662 (PC); Bradley v Attorney-General [1988] 2 NZLR 454 (HC).  
41 Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 (PC).             
42 Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 3. 
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manner of exercise.43  Even for many years following the Second World War (1939-1945), the royal 
prerogative resisted broader developments in administrative law: 44  
 
“As the courts began flexing their judicial review powers, the prerogative distanced itself, as 
something of great antiquity to be treated apart from discretionary statutory powers … 
Judicial acknowledgement of the court’s duty to prevent abuse of the prerogative was 
perfunctory and token.”   
 
The courts refused to examine the appropriateness or adequacy of the grounds for exercising the 
prerogative,45 or to allow bad faith to be attributed to the Crown.46  The very non-existence of a 
power to review was itself a defining criterion of prerogative power.  In R v Lewes JJ, ex parte Home 
Secretary,47 the Lord Chancellor refused to uphold as a prerogative the withholding of evidence from 
disclosure in court as the authorities established that the discretion of the Crown was subject to 
judicial review.48 
 
A distinction based on the source of public powers was avowedly formalist.  The prerogative 
surrended its royal heritage when cabinet government was established over 200 years ago.  The 
Sovereign (or Sovereign’s representative) acts on and in accordance with her/his ministers’ advice, 
which commits the prerogative to the government’s service.  Prerogative power is conceptually and 
analytically no different than discretionary statutory power.  The breakthrough occurred in Laker 
Airways Ltd v Department of Trade,49 where Lord Denning MR cast aside the mystique of the 
prerogative.  He saw no good reason for distinguishing public powers according to their source, be 
they statutory or common law powers.  “[T]he prerogative,” he said, “is a discretionary power to be 
exercised for the public good, [and] it follows that its exercise can be examined by the Courts just as 
 
43 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63, 77 ER 1342; Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, 77 ER 
1352; Rustomjee v R (1876) 2 QBD 69 (CA); Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] NZLR 
590 (PC); Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 (HL). 
44 Joseph at [18.6.1], citing Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 (HL) at 811. 
45 R v Allen (1862) 1 B & S 850 (nolle prosequi); Bugsier Reederei-und-Bergungs A/G v SS Brighton [1951] 2 TLR 
409 (licence granted to enemy company to sue in a British court); Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[1964] AC 763 at 790-792, 796, 800-801, 814 (disposition of the armed forces).  See the further authorities 
cited by SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 254 (n 
39). 
46 Duncan v Theodore (1917) 23 CLR 510 (HCA) at 544; Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 
CLR 1 (HCA) at 257-258.  
47 R v Lewes JJ, ex parte Home Secretary [1972] 3 WLR 279 (HL) at 282. 
48 Public interest immunity against disclosure of evidence in court was once termed a Crown privilege but it 
was never prerogative in character: see Joseph at [18.4.2(4)(a)].   
49 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 (CA). 
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any other discretionary power which is vested in the executive.”50  The courts might intervene if the 
prerogative was exercised “improperly” or “mistakenly”.51             
 
Denning’s initiative cleared the way for more general acceptance of the reviewability of prerogative 
power.  In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service,52 the House of Lords 
renounced the source of public powers, as no longer relevant to principles of judicial review.  
Prerogative power was as amendable to judicial review as discretionary statutory power, and on the 
same grounds, subject to considerations of justiciability.  The subject-matter, not the source, of a 
power determined whether its exercise was reviewable.  Several prerogatives remain non-justiciable 
by nature: foreign relations, defence of the realm, appointment of ministers, etc.  Other 
prerogatives, in contrast, are reviewable.53  A decision refusing clemency under the prerogative of 
mercy is reviewable if it was arbitrary or perverse, or in breach of fair procedure or the rules of 
natural justice.54  A perverse exercise of other prerogatives would also be reviewable, such as the 
grant of honours for reward, the waging of a war of “manifest aggression”, or a refusal to exercise 
the prerogative to dissolve Parliament.55  Assimilating prerogative and statutory powers in judicial 
review cleared the way for purging another false dichotomy – ministerial versus other public 
decision-making.    
 
(vi) Ministerial v non-ministerial decision-making 
 
Following the war years, the courts treated ministerial decision-making differently from other public 
decision-making.  Judicial review of ministers’ decisions, although available in theory, “was little 
more than perfunctory on matters of substance”.56  The judicial attitude bordered on deferential 
servitude.  The courts disclaimed power to review a minister’s exercise of discretionary powers, even 
where the policy element was negligible.  Judges were quick to defer and assert a minister’s 
 
50 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 (CA) at 705. 
51 Laker Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643 (CA) at 706.  
52 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL). 
53 Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Bentley [1994] QB 349 (DC); Lewis v Attorney-General (Jamaica)  [2001] 2 AC 50 (PC). 
54 Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA) at 681; Lewis v Attorney-General (Jamaica) [2001] 2 AC 50 
(PC) at [54] (following Burt).  
55 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2007] EWCA Civ 498, [2008] 
QB 365 at [46]. Judicial review of a refusal to dissolve Parliament would not arise in New Zealand.  Parliament 
automatically terminates through expiration of time in the absence of dissolution: Constitution Act 1986, s 17. 
56 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 28. 
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responsibility to Parliament, although ministerial responsibility was often no more than token.57  The 
courts intervened only if an error was flagrant, damage to private interests substantial and the 
decision entailed no policy element.  Distinguishing ministerial from other types of decision-making 
undermined any claim that administrative law was principled and coherent in application.58 
 
None of the standard grounds of judicial review seemed to gain traction.  The courts typically 
refused to hold that a minister had: acted ultra vires; promoted an unauthorised purpose; breached 
the principles of natural justice; failed to have regard to relevant considerations; been improperly 
influenced by irrelevant ones; or acted unreasonably under the Wednesbury test.59  De Smith 
lamented that, if a minister was under a statutory duty to give reasons for a decision, “it was almost 
impossible to persuade a court to draw adverse inferences from his [or her] silence”.60  Where 
ministers were empowered to decide if “satisfied” that a prescribed state of affairs existed, the 
courts interpreted the power literally and refused to question the minister’s assertion that the 
required belief was genuinely held.  Similarly, under the then description “Crown privilege”, a 
minister might withhold documents from disclosure in court merely by certifying that disclosure 
would be contrary to the public interest.  The courts refused to question the objectivity of the 
minister’s claim.61  
 
With changing social expectations and standards of public accountability, the courts began 
subjecting ministerial decision-making to closer scrutiny.  As of 1973, de Smith observed that judicial 
review had become “less technical, less compartmentalised, more imaginative”.62  The courts 
became disinclined to interpret statutes as giving ministers conclusive power to determine the limits 
of their power.  Ministerial assessments as to the existence of states of affairs warranted objective 
verification.  Nowadays, no distinction is made for ministerial decision-making, which is amenable to 
review on the same principles as apply to other forms of decision-making.  Ministers’ decisions are 
 
57 Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410 (CA) at 424 (ministerial responsibility a “mere shadow of a 
name”); Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1982] AC 617 (HL) at 202. 
58 Joseph at [22.2.3] 
59 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 28.  
60 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 28. 
61 Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co [1942] AC 624 (HL).  Compare Robinson v South Australia (No 2) [1931] AC 704 
(PC); Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 (HL) (Duncan’s case overruled, documents inspected by the court and 
disclosure ordered notwithstanding the claim of Crown privilege). 
62 SA de Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1973) at 38. 
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prone to address considerations of the national interest and be held non-justiciable,63 but that is a 
quite different matter from singling out ministerial decisions for special treatment in judicial review. 
 
(vii) Void v voidable  
 
The consequences of invalidity drew a formalist response from the courts:  decisions reached in 
error were either void or voidable.  Different legal consequences attached accordingly.64  Ultra vires 
decisions were outside jurisdiction and of no legal effect (void), whereas other decisions vitiated by 
error were intra vires and of continuing legal effect (voidable).  Void decisions were void ab initio (a 
legal nothing), whereas voidable decisions were valid and effective unless and until a court of 
competent jurisdiction set the decision aside:65 
 
 “The distinction was one between retrospective and prospective invalidation.  A declaration 
that an order was ultra vires entailed retrospective invalidation from the time the order was 
made, whereas the quashing of a voidable order had prospective effect from the time of the 
court’s decision.  Prior acts carried out under the order were not subject to challenge.” 
 
This approach was termed the absolute theory of invalidity.  The theory was convenient for 
upholding rights (unauthorised decisions were void ab initio and could not prejudice private 
interests) and circumventing privative clauses (a privative clause could not protect a decision that in 
law was a nullity).  But the theory also suffered from serious conceptual flaws.  In Ridge v Baldwin,66 
the applicant was dismissed from office in 1958 in breach of the rules of natural justice.  In litigation 
challenging the dismissal, the judicial process ground on until 1963 when the House of Lords finally 
ruled in the applicant’s favour.  His dismissal was ultra vires and void, which in law meant that he 
(the applicant) had never been dismissed.  Yet, for five years, he had neither held nor performed his 
office and had received no remuneration.  The position he vacated, moreover, had long since been 
filled.  These events left unanswered several questions.  The law provided for only one office holder. 
Consequently, had the applicant’s successor ever held office?  If not, on what basis was he receiving 
remuneration?  If the applicant had never in law been dismissed, was he entitled to reclaim five-
years’ lost remuneration?  Would the incumbent who replaced him be liable to repay the 
 
63 See for example Curtis v Minister of Defence [2002] NZLR 744 (CA) (ministerial decisions affecting the 
disposition of the armed forces non-justiciable).   
64 See Joseph at [22.10]. 
65 Joseph at [22.10.1]. 
66 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL). 
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remuneration had and received?  These conundrums were insoluble under the absolute theory of 
invalidity.     
 
The absolute theory also produced legally absurd results.  In Denton v Auckland City,67 a statutory 
right of administrative appeal to a higher authority entailed a rehearing de novo, with the appellate 
body having power to rehear and call fresh evidence.  However, the appeal could not cure a breach 
of natural justice as the initial decision was “a nullity and there was nothing upon which the Appeal 
Board could proceed”.68  A decision reached on appeal was itself a nullity, as the appellate body was 
without jurisdiction – there was nothing against which to appeal.69  These were legally absurd 
outcomes (reductio ad absurdum) for which the law had to find a solution.  The void/voidable 
distinction was as unstable as the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error. 
 
The law did find a solution, although it, too, was not without complication.  Lord Diplock was in the 
vanguard: “My Lords, I think it leads to confusion to use such terms as ‘voidable’, ‘voidable ab initio’, 
‘void’ or ‘a nullity’.”70  These descriptions derived from the private law of contract and were ill-
adapted to public law.  The courts sought an alternative approach and applied Sir William Wade’s 
theory of legal relativity, which circumnavigates the void/voidable distinction.71  Stark categories 
such as “void”, “voidable” and “nullity” were jettisoned in preference for more amorphous terms 
such as “invalid”, “vitiated” or “defective”, which do not fix the legal consequences of invalidity.  
Decisions or orders tainted by error of law were treated as valid – as having existence in law – until 
they were successfully challenged on an application for review: “[H]owever wrong they may be, 
however lacking in jurisdiction they may be, [decisions tainted by error] subsist and remain fully 
effective unless and until they are set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.”72  Under Wade’s 
theory, the presumption of validity legitimises all public administration in the absence of a successful 
legal challenge.    
 
The theory of legal relativity avoided the legal contortions that had afflicted courts under the 
absolute theory.  The void/voidable dichotomy was riddled with complexity that caused the law to 
 
67 Denton v Auckland City [1969] NZLR 256 (SC). 
68 Denton v Auckland City [1969] NZLR 256 (SC) at 269. 
69 Denton v Auckland City [1969] NZLR 256 (SC) at 256. 
70 F Hoffmann La Roche & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 (HL) at 399.  See also 
London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189-190.  
71 See Joseph at [22.10.3]. 
72 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815 (CA) at 840.  See also F Hoffmann 
La Roche & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 (HL); Air New Zealand Ltd v 
Wellington International Airport Ltd [2009] NZCA 259, [2009] 23 NZLR 713 at [84]-[86].   
13 
 
unravel.  However, the solution the courts devised had itself to make significant concessions. A 
category of “flagrantly invalid” decision was recognised to accommodate the right of collateral 
challenge in inferior courts; such decisions did not trigger the presumption of validity and were 
treated as a legal nullity, which any court might declare.73  Moreover, a successfully challenged 
decision was “hypothetically a nullity” (void from its inception) but treated as presumptively valid in 
the interim.  The conceptual difficulty was treating as valid something that was void ab initio.74  That 
conundrum continues to tax the courts, although some relief has been had from the development of 
the remedies of partial or prospective invalidation.75    
 
(viii) Mandatory v directory  
 
In London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council,76 Lord Hailsham LC shunned from 
the legal lexicon the mandatory/directory dichotomy.  He rejected language which “presuppose[d] 
the existence of stark categories such as ‘mandatory’ and ‘directory’, ‘void’ and ‘voidable’, a ‘nullity’, 
and ‘purely regulatory’”.77  The mandatory/directory dichotomy is now superseded but it once 
played a decisive role in judicial review.  It did so 60 years ago in an extraordinary challenge to New 
Zealand’s parliamentary system.   
 
Until Fitzgerald v Muldoon,78 Simpson v Attorney-General79 was New Zealand’s landmark 
constitutional case.  No-one seems to know anything about the redoubtable Mr Simpson, or what 
persuaded him to bring his challenge.  He established that administrative oversight had caused the 
1946 general election to be held outside of the statutory timetable prescribed under the electoral 
legislation.  This, he argued, invalidated the 1946 general election, and thereto all subsequent 
elections which likewise had been conducted outside of the statutory timetable.  Had his challenge 
succeeded, all post-1946 legislation and all government spending under it would have been invalid, 
as would everything purporting to have been done under post-1946 statutory authority.  Either the 
courts would have been forced to draw upon the doctrine of necessity (a last resort in times of 
 
73 See for example New Zealand Employers Federation Inc v National Union of Public Employees [2002] 2 NZLR 
54 (CA) discussed in Joseph at [22.10.3].  
74 Joseph at [22.10.3]. 
75 See for example R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815 (CA) at 842; 
Martin v Ryan [1990] 2 NZLR 209 (HC) at 235, 238-241. 
76 London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189. 
77 London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189. 
78 Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 (SC). 
79 Simpson v Attorney-General [1955] NZLR 271 (SC and CA). 
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constitutional emergency),80 or the government would have needed to request United Kingdom 
legislation to post-validate the 1946 election and all subsequent elections and legislation, and all 
actions purportedly taken under such legislation.81 
 
It was a remarkable constitutional challenge.  The Chief Justice reflected that the challenge, if 
upheld, would have worked “serious general inconvenience”.82  “General inconvenience” was a droll 
euphemism for constitutional breakdown.  But was the challenge ever likely to succeed?  The 
machinery of state is geared towards self-preservation and will do everything it can to avert 
constitutional breakdown.  The timetable provisions of the Electoral Act in 1946 were couched in the 
imperative language “shall”, not “may”, which was indicative of mandatory obligations.  
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal applied the mandatory/directory dichotomy and held the 
timetable provisions to be directory only, which averted constitutional breakdown.  Substantial, as 
distinct from strict, compliance was all that the statutory timetable required.   
 
A determination that a statutory requirement was mandatory or directory entailed a priori 
reasoning.  The choice of classification was a lottery, although it presupposed the outcome of the 
case (as in Simpson v Attorney-General).  In many cases, the mandatory/directory distinction was 
unworkable: binary choices were simply not possible.  Some situations cannot be shoe-horned into 
“one or other of mutually exclusive and starkly contrasted compartments”.83 The context of 
decision-making may present, not a stark binary choice, but a “spectrum of possibilities in which one 
compartment or description fades gradually into another”.84  Statutory provisions may effectively 
conflate the classifications, leaving them without a function,85 or the descriptors “mandatory” and 
“directory” may lack utility.  In Howard v Secretary of State for the Environment,86 Lord Roskill found 
that all of the statutory requirements were mandatory but held that failure to comply did not 
invalidate the action.  Here, the descriptors failed to discharge their purpose of fixing the 
consequences of invalidity.     
 
 
80 See Joseph at [19.11] for the role of the doctrine. 
81 The Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947, s 3(1) would ordinarily require such request and consent to 
be conveyed by Act of the New Zealand Parliament but the adoption Act would have been invalid and 
inoperative alongside all other post-1946 statutes.  
82 Simpson v Attorney-General [1955] NZLR 271 (SC and CA) at 275. 
83 London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189. 
84 London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189. 
85 Mansell v Legal Services Agency HC Wellington AP261/02, Goddard J, 9 May 2003.  See also Howard v 
Secretary of State for the Environment [1975] QB 235; [1974] 1 All ER 644 (CA).   
86 Howard v Secretary of State for the Environment [1975] QB 235; [1974] 1 All ER 644 (CA).   
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For modern courts, the question is not one of stark categorisation.87  Determining the nature of an 
obligation entails substantive reasoning and deduction, working from the particular statutory 
context.  Cooke J (as he then was) displayed characteristic prescience:88   
 
“Whether [or not] non-compliance with a procedural requirement is fatal turns less on 
attaching a perhaps indefinite label to that requirement than on considering its place in the 
scheme of the Act or regulations and the degree and seriousness of the non-compliance.”  
 
Modern courts occasionally use the descriptors “mandatory” and “directory” but not as a matter of 
categorical classification.  The descriptors are used as end-points in the court’s analysis, not, as 
before, as preliminary findings that predetermined the judicial outcome.   Courts look to the scheme 
of the legislation and the relationship of the statutory requirement to it.89  What were the 
consequences of non-compliance?   Was it likely to cause prejudice, administrative difficulty or 
disruption to industry?  The courts assess whether the breach was of a flagrant nature that 
compromised the integrity of the scheme, or whether it was of a minor or procedural nature that 
might safely be ignored.90  The effects of non-compliance are assessed using the standard 
methodology of overall evaluation.91   
 
(ix) Standing v non-standing  
 
“Locus standi” denotes the legal capacity to challenge a decision.  Until a landmark decision of the 
House of Lords in 1982,92 the courts applied the law of locus standi strictly, as a preliminary, 
gatekeeping requirement of judicial review.  Standing was an onerous obstacle.  Would-be litigants 
had to establish particular or special damage that distinguished them from the rest of the 
community.  Applicants who suffered in no direct or appreciable way lacked standing to bring their 
case.      
 
Standing was a jurisdictional issue addressed separately from the substantive challenge.  In the 
leading decision at first instance, Lord Widgery CJ stated: “Before we embark on the case itself, we 
 
87 See London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189. 
88 New Zealand Institute of Agricultural Science Inc v Ellesmere County [1976] 1 NZLR 630 (CA) at 636. 
89 See Steinborn v Minister of Immigration [2002] 1 NZLR 639; [2002] NZAR 36 (CA); Mansell v Legal Services 
Agency HC Wellington AP261/02, Goddard J, 9 May 2003.  
90 London and Clydeside Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council [1980] 1 WLR 182 (HL) at 189. 
91 AJ Burr Ltd v Blenheim Borough Council [1980] 2 NZLR 1 (CA) at 4. 
92 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 
617 (HL).  
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have to decide whether the [applicant] has power to bring it at all.”93  The common law recognised 
differing standing rules for the separate writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.94  These 
technical rules survived even the liberalising provisions of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, 
which assimilated the separate writs into a single application for review.  Certiorari and prohibition 
lay as of right to a party aggrieved: one who suffered “a particular grievance” rather than a grievance 
“in common with the rest of the subjects”.95  Mandamus imposed a yet more exacting 
requirement.96  Litigants had to establish “a legal specific right to ask for the interference of the 
Court”.97  The duty, whose enforcement was sought, had to be owed to a particular class of persons 
of whom the applicant was a member.98  If the duty was in favour of the public at large, then an 
applicant had to establish a “special interest” that distinguished the applicant from all other 
citizens.99  Strict rules also hedged the remedies of injunction and declaration adapted from the 
private law sphere.  An applicant had to establish that an interference with a public right also 
infringed a private legal right, or that the applicant suffered special damage not suffered by the 
public at large.100  “Special damage” was damage different in quality from, or greater in degree than, 
that suffered by the general public. 
 
Remedies were not ex debito justitiae (as of right).  The restrictive standing rules were protective 
floodgates to guard against vexatious litigants harassing public bodies and swamping the courts.101  
Allowing busybodies to prosecute their eccentric causes would consume the courts’ time and 
resources, and clog the wheels of justice.   Remedies were correlative with rights and only persons 
whose rights were directly and substantially affected might seek a remedy. The one respite was 
through the relator action, which bypassed the technical rules.  The Attorney-General as the first law 
officer of the Crown might consent, on the request of a private person (a “relator”), to sue a public 
body for transgressing the law.  
  
 
93 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 
917 (HL) at 630 per Lord Wilberforce quoting Lord Widgery CJ, expressing a view rejected on appeal. 
94 For discussion see Joseph at [27.6.2]. 
95 The Queen v Justices of Surrey (1870) LR 5 QB 466 (DC) at 747.  See also Mayor and Aldermen of the City of 
Landon v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239 (HL) at 283; R v Liverpool Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ 
Association [1972] 2 QB 299 (CA) at 308-309; Paterson v Dunedin City Council [1981] 2 NZL:R 619 (HC) at 621. 
96 R v Hereford Corporation, ex parte Harrower [1970] 1 WLR 1424 (DC) at 1428 (“a far more stringent test”). 
97 The Queen v Guardians of the Lewisham Union [1897] 1 QB 498 (DC) at 500, followed in R v Commissioner of 
Customs and Excise, ex parte Cooke [1970] 1 WLR 450 (DC).  
98 Environmental Defence Society Inc v Agricultural Chemicals Board [1973] 2 NZLR 758 (SC). 
99 The Queen v Cotham [1898] 1 QB 802 (DC) at 804; Victoria University of Wellington Students Association Inc 
v Shearer (Government Printer) [1973] 2 NZLR 21 (SC) at 23. 
100 Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109 (CH). 
101 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 
617 (HL) at 630.  
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The standing/non-standing dichotomy worked a serious disadvantage to litigants.  Changing social 
expectations demanded more pro-active policing of public decision-making, whether or not special 
damage might be established.  In Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd,102 the House of Lords finally prised open the floodgates.  The 
decision was a circuit-breaker for public interest groups and publicly-spirited citizens concerned to 
vindicate the rule of law.   It would be “a grave lacuna in our system of public law”, Lord Diplock 
observed, were a concerned citizen prevented from having the law enforced.103  Standing was no 
longer a bridge to be crossed before the substantive hearing but was considered as part of the 
application for review.  Standing was a question of mixed law and fact to be assessed according to 
the merits of the case.104             
 
Common-sense trumped fears of judicial overload and vexatious litigants.  Inland Revenue 
Commissioners liberated the law from a dichotomy that constricted the right of access to justice.  
There was no apparent increase in vexatious or frivolous litigation following the relaxation of the 
rules.105  The financial costs involved are usually sufficient to deter even the obsessed from indulging 
in unmeritorious litigation.  An American study long ago exposed the fallacy of the “meddlesome 
interloper”.  That fictitious character “‘haunt[ed] the legal literature, not the courtroom”.106  
 
(x) Public v private bodies 
 
Administrative law is concerned to uphold the legality of public administration.  So, the courts set 
about distinguishing public bodies from private bodies and confining judicial review to the former.  
This entrenched another constraining dichotomy which took many years to undo.  While the focus of 
judicial review remains on public decision-making, the distinction between “public” and “private” is 
not dispositive today of questions of reviewability.  Classifying a body as “public” or “private” is not a 
preliminary jurisdictional matter but is indicative only of the reach of judicial review.  It is merely one 
among several considerations factored into the overall mix of judicial review.     
 
102 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 
617 (HL). 
103 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 
617 (HL) at 644.  See also R v Greater London Council, ex parte Blackburn [1976] 1 WLR 550 (CA) at 559 (“a 
matter of high constitutional principle”).   
104 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 
617 (HL) at 631 per Lord Wilberforce, 653 per Lord Scarman.  See also Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football 
Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR 159 (HC and CA) at 178. 
105 See Lord Woolf, J Jowell and A le Sueur De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action (6th ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2007) at 100-102.  




Under the former public/private dichotomy, bodies were caricatured according to their functions or 
powers.  Public bodies exhibited defined characteristics: they exercised public regulatory functions 
and/or were empowered under statute to discharge prescribed public purposes.  Private bodies, in 
contrast, neither performed public regulatory functions nor exercised public power.  They lacked any 
public persona but were indelibly “private”, attending to interests within the “private” sphere, or 
exercising private commercial functions.  Decisions involving commercial judgment were termed 
“private” and beyond the reach of administrative law.107   
 
The binary approach to public versus private bodies could not survive the modern regime of judicial 
review.  Private bodies per se are not immune from review.  The following bodies have been 
judicially reviewed: the New Zealand Rugby Union,108 a political party operating under first-past-the-
post elections,109 a financial market’s regulatory body,110 an advertising industry standards 
authority,111 and the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s administering body.112  Each of those 
organisations was a private rather than public entity, although it was amenable to review.  These 
developments trump the public/private dichotomy and subject it to the same fate as the other 
dichotomies.  Today, there is no appetite for a priori labels when fixing the reach of judicial review or 
adjudging the legality of decision-making of a public nature or having significant public 
consequences.   
 
The governing test is whether the exercise of power is “in substance public” or has “important public 
consequences”.113  Even private bodies exercising commercial functions may be susceptible to 
review.  Modern courts are sensitive to the impact of commercialised public functions and the public 
consequences of commercial decisions by private bodies.114   The decisions of state-owned 
 
107 See New Zealand Stock Exchange v Listed Companies Association Inc [1984] 1 NZLR 699 (CA). 
108 Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR 159 (HC and CA). 
109 Peters v Collinge [1993] 2 NZLR 554 (HC) (political parties operating under the mixed member proportional 
electoral system have greater statutory recognition and public profile under the Electoral 1993 than under the 
former first-past-the-post legislation).  
110 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 QB 815 (CA). 
111 Electoral Commission v Cameron [1997] 2 NZLR 421 (CA). 
112 Wilson v White [2005] 1 NZLR 189 (CA). 
113 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps [1999] 3 NZLR 1 (CA) at 11.  
114 See for example Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC) at 
388; O’Leary v Health Funding Authority [2001] NZAR 717 (HC) at 727; Videbeck v Auckland City Council [2002] 
3 NZLR 842 (HC) at 850, 853; Dunne v CanWest TV Works Ltd [2005] NZAR 577 (HC); Easton v Human Rights 
Commission [2009] NZAR 575 (HC).  
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enterprises, for example, are reviewable.115  It is a question of degree “the point at which a private 
commercial operation [may] merge into a public one attracting judicial review”.116  One judge was 
pragmatically honest: it may reduce to a “matter of impression” whether a commercial body’s 
decisions have sufficient public impact as to attract judicial review.117   
 
C Judicial review today  
 
The unpicking of the post-war dichotomies provides glimpses into the modern law of judicial review.  
This section captures the flavour of judicial review today.  It sketches the key features of an 
enterprise that espouses judicial directness and honesty of mind over the formal trappings of 
pedagogy and legal doctrine.  The sketch provides a fitting end-point to the transformation that 
administrative law underwent.   
 
(i) Simple, untechnical, prompt 
 
Today’s commitment is to keep judicial review “relatively simple, untechnical and prompt”.118  This 
approach presents a sharp departure from the judicial method that was wedded to ultra vires and 
jurisdictional/non-jurisdictional error.  The simpler construct “material error of law” replaced ultra 
vires as the central plank of judicial review.119  In Peters v Davison,120 the Court of Appeal 
emphasised the rule-of-law rationale that public bodies must comply with the law that regulates 
their decision-making powers.  Their Honours were intent on burying the ultra vires doctrine.  A 
 
115 Albeit on the narrow grounds of fraud, corruption or bad faith: see Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC); Auckland Electric Power Board v Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 551 (CA); Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health 
Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 2 NZLR 776 at [91]; Attorney-General v Ririnui [2015] NZCA 160 at [77]. 
116 He Putea Atawhai Trust v Health Funding Authority HC Auckland CP497/97, 8 October 1998 at 5.   
117 Ministry of Health v Dalley HC Christchurch M569/96, 12 August 1998 per William Young J.  
118 Minister of Energy v Petrocorp Exploration Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 348 (CA) at 353.  Numerous courts have 
repeated those words: for example Association of Dispensing Opticians of New Zealand Inc v Opticians Board 
[2000] 1 NZLR 158 (CA) at [19]; Edwards v Toime [2005] NZAR 140 (HC) at [20]; Wilson v White [2005] 1 NZLR 
189 (CA) at [25]; Commerce Commission v Powerco Ltd CA123/06, 9 November 2006 at [40]; Lab Tests 
Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 1 NZLR 776 at [342]; Orlov v New 
Zealand Law Society [2012] NZCA 12 at [21]; Attorney-General v Kim Dotcom [2013] NZCA 43, [2013] 2 NZLR 
213 at [39].    
119 Bulk Gas Users Group v Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 129 (CA); Hawkins v Minister of Justice [1991] 2 NZLR 
530 (CA); Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1995] 3 NZLR 664 (CA); Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 
(CA).  
120 Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 183, 129.  See also Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation 
of New Zealand [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC) at 388; Videbeck v Auckland City Council [2002] 3 NZLR 842 (HC) at 850; 
Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 690 (CA) at 696.    
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material error of law was reviewable “in and of itself”, they held: “[I]t [was] not necessary to show 
that the error was one that caused the tribunal or Court to go beyond its jurisdiction.”121 
 
(ii) Three features 
 
Three features distinguish judicial review in the modern era: it is “inherently discretionary”,122 it 
involves “overall evaluation”123 and it is pre-eminently contextual.124  These observations must be 
tempered with a degree of realism: the emphasis on discretion, evaluation and context does not 
release courts from the established disciplines.  Constitutional and democratic constraints 
circumscribe the acceptability of judicial review.125  The institutional separation of powers checks the 
judicial function and counsels courts against trespassing on matters of executive or administrative 
policy.126  Parliament authorises public decision-making and the courts are careful not to usurp the 
functions of the mandated decision-maker.  Thus, the larger the policy content of an impugned 
decision, the less inclined the courts are to intervene.127  Decision-making that engages “wide-
ranging or ‘macro-political’ issues of policy” will seldom, if ever, be amendable to review.128   
 
The High Court’s jurisdiction to review is inherent, having no a priori limits: “[A] superior court of 
general jurisdiction, such as the High Court of Justice, has the jurisdiction to determine … the limits 
of its own jurisdiction.”129  The only legal limits are those that the particular empowering legislation 
might impose.130  Nevertheless, the courts abide their self-assumed disciplines and assess challenges 
to public decision-making in accordance with accepted principles of judicial review.  The reviewing 
court must select the appropriate ground of review (illegality, unreasonableness/irrationality or 
procedural impropriety), weigh the specific factual and interpretive features of the case, and 
exercise judgment as to what the justice of the case requires.  Seldom does judicial review reduce to 
 
121 Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 (CA) at 181 per Richardson P, Henry and Keith JJ. 
122 Martin v Ryan [1990] 2 NZLR 209 (HC) at 236. 
123 AJ Burr Ltd v Blenheim Borough Council [1980] 2 NZLR 1 (CA) at 4.  
124 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532 at [28]. 
125 Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA) at 546. 
126 Petrocorp Exploration Ltd v Minister of Energy [1991] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at 45-46. 
127 Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA) at 546.  See also 
CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 (CA) at 198. 
128 Abdi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [69].  The paradigm decision 
exemplifying non-justiciability in New Zealand is Curtis v Minister of Defence [2002] 2 NZLR 744 (CA) (the 
government decision to disband the combat wing of the Royal New Zealand Air Force held non-justiciable). 
129 R v Bedwellty Justices, ex parte Williams [1997] AC 225 (HL) at 232.  See also New Zealand Waterside 
Workers’ Federation Industrial Association of Workers v Frazer [1924] NZLR 689 (SC) at 707; Re Kestle (No 2) 
[1980] 2 NZLR 353 (CA) at 358.   




a formulaic exercise in statutory interpretation: Did the decision-maker act within the four corners 
of the power Parliament conferred?131  Applications for review are typically assessed within the 
particular context of the decision-making and involve overall evaluation of the procedural and 
cognitive processes that led to the impugned decision.      
 
(iii) Instinctual nature of judicial review 
 
The courts acknowledge the instinctual nature of judicial review.132  An exchange between Bench 
and Bar in Ye v Minister of Immigration133 exemplified the evaluative and contextual nature of the 
court’s task.134  In the parry and thrust with counsel, Tipping J alluded to the reality of judicial 
review: “[I]n the end, you interfere if you think you should.”135 He acknowledged the instinctual 
judgment that drives judicial review:136 
 
 “And the Court must interfere where it must.” 
 “You either feel driven to interfere or you don’t, and that will depend on what sort of right it 
is and what the whole shebang is.” 
 
The “whole shebang” meant context: “In law context is everything.”137  Thus we return to the three 
determinants that trigger the decision to intervene: discretion, evaluation and context.  There are 
differing formulations for describing the instinctual impulse, although the classical formulation was 
Lord Donaldson’s direct but penetrating question in R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte 
Guinness plc:138  “whether something had gone wrong of a nature and degree which required the 
intervention of the court and, if so, what form that intervention should take”.139  Woolf LJ, too, 
reduced the question to one of instinctual impulse: Did the decision inflict “real injustice”?140  
Findings of injustice typically unearth errors in the decision-making procedures, deliberative 
 
131 Compare Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA) at 545. 
132 See generally Joseph at [22.4].   
133 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104.  The exchange is recorded in the Transcript 
of the case SC53/2008, 21 April 2009 at [178[-[182]. 
134 See D Knight “Mapping the Rainbow of Review: Recognising Variable Intensity” [2010] NZ Law Rev 393 at 
400-401; PA Joseph “Exploratory Questions in Administrative Law” (2012) 25 NZULR 73 at 85-86; Joseph at 
[22.4.3]. 
135 Ye v Minister of Immigration Transcript SC53/2008, 21 April 2009 at [182]. 
136 Ye v Minister of Immigration Transcript SC53/2008, 21 April 2009 at [178]-[182]. 
137 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532 at [28] per Lord 
Steyn. 
138 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146 (CA). 
139 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146 (CA) at 160. 
140 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146 (CA) at 194. 
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processes or application of statutory power.  The forensic task is to identify what, in short, caused 
the decision-making to misfire.141   
 
A variation is the “abuse of power” analysis advanced in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2).142   Applying a public power for an unauthorised purpose is often 
described as an abuse of power.  So, too, is breach of a legitimate expectation: it is an abuse for 
decision-makers to renege on their public undertakings.143  In Bancoult the impugned Orders in 
Council revoked the British Government’s undertaking to allow the former inhabitants of the Chagos 
Islands to return to their homeland.  These Orders were “so profoundly unfair”, the Court held, as to 
be an “abuse of power”.144  For Sedley LJ, the expression “abuse of power” was sufficiently generic 
that it could be used to embrace a raft of decision-making errors.145      
 
(iv) Struggle for simplicity 
 
Former President of the Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke, railed against the formulaic language that 
encumbered judicial review in the years following the war.  His doctoral studies at Cambridge 
brought home the distracting formalism that was choking the courts.146  Thirty years on, his seminal 
address, “The struggle for simplicity in administrative law”,147 became synonymous for the direct and 
uncomplicated language that now defines judicial review.  Sir Robin’s aspiration was to keep judicial 
review “relatively simple, untechnical and prompt”.148   
 
 
141 Joseph at [22.4.2]. 
142 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2007] EWCA Civ 498, [2008] 
QB 365. 
143 See R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 (CA); Staunton 
Investments Ltd v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries [2004] NZAR 68 (HC); Abdi v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [67]; R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2007] EWCA 498, [2008] QB 365 at [60], [73].    
144 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2007] EWCA 498, [2008] QB 
365 at [73].    
145 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2007] EWCA 498, [2008] QB 
365 at [60].    
146 RB Cooke “Jurisdiction: An Essay in Constitutional, Administrative and Procedural Law” (PhD, University of 
Cambridge, 1954) discussed by MB Taggart “The Contribution of Lord Cooke to scope of review doctrine in 
administrative law: A comparative common law perspective” in P Rishworth (ed) The Struggle for Simplicity in 
the Law: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997). 
147 Sir Robin Cooke “The struggle for simplicity in Administrative Law” in M Taggart (ed) Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects (OUP, Auckland, 1986).   
148 Sir Robin was the first to utter these words in delivering judgment of the Court in Minister of Energy v 
Petrocorp Exploration Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 348 (CA) at 353.  See n 116 for a long list of decisions that have since 
repeated his words.    
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The “struggle for simplicity” does not extol the impossible.  The law of judicial review is not, and 
never has been, “simple”.  A specialist area of law, judicial review draws on deep understanding of 
first principles and an extensive knowledge of case law.  The struggle for simplicity is an admonition 
against making the law more complicated than it needs to be.  Administrative law prospers from as 
few analytical models, doctrinal overlays and binary choices as is rationally possible to support a 
coherent regime of judicial review. 
 
E Questionable developments    
 
The unpicking of the post-war dichotomies has cleansed administrative law of the shibboleths that 
afflicted the discipline.  It has been honed so that it is now freed of distracting complexities.   But is 
it?  Might there be aspects of our administrative law that give cause for unease?  Four developments 
are singled out for scrutiny.       
 
(i) Unreasonableness review 
 
Variable intensity review has all but superseded Wednesbury unreasonableness as a ground of 
challenge.149  Wednesbury attracted its fair share of criticism.150  It posited a single, monolithic 
standard of unreasonableness that was oblivious to context and the impact of impugned decisions.  
Variable intensity review evolved to fill the void.  It factors into the evaluative exercise both context 
and impact in calibrating the appropriate intensity of review.  Nevertheless, how much 
understanding has been achieved around this variegated ground of challenge?   
 
Variable intensity review is at risk of collapsing under a proliferation of terminologies.  Eleven 
distinct expressions calibrate the intensities of review.151  These range from super-Wednesbury 
unreasonableness at one end of the spectrum to correctness review at the other, with a range of 
intensities between (unreasonableness simpliciter, substantive unfairness, hard look, anxious 
 
149 The Wednesbury standard of review is retained in certain statutory contexts: see for example Kaur v Chief 
Executive, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZCA 592.  
150 See Lord Cooke of Thorndon’s withering pronouncement in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532 at [32]. 
151 Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104.  The exchange is recorded in the transcript 
of the Court’s hearing: Transcript SC 53/2008, 21 April 2009 at 178- 182.  The exchange is reproduced in D 
Knight “Mapping the Rainbow of Review: Recognising Variable Intensity” [2010] NZ L Rev 393 at 400-401. 
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scrutiny, etc).152  It has been suggested that this proliferation of terminologies might lead to a 
“resurgent formalism” in administrative law.153  More ink has been spilled on this ground of review 
than the others combined, leaving real doubt whether the benefits outweigh the costs.   
 
Might unreasonableness challenges be dispensed with in their entirety?154  The standard response is 
“no” as there should always be a fall-back ground of last resort.  Variable intensity review provides 
redress for misuses of administrative power that might otherwise go unchecked.  However, how 
valuable is unreasonableness review?  This ground is rarely, if ever, successfully pleaded in its own 
right.  It is, for all intents and purposes, “forensically parasitic”.155 It typically comes into play only 
after other reviewable errors in the decision-making are uncovered.156  Three judicial review cases 
this century (2000-2015) have succeeded on a stand-alone finding of unreasonableness (on average, 
one decision every five years). 157  A cost/benefit analysis of Wednesbury’s legacy might support the 
decision to jettison the ground.     
 
(ii) Giving of reasons 
 
The law governing the giving of reasons for decisions is woefully deficient.  Decision-makers are 
under no general duty to explain their decisions.158  Fairness may require the giving of reasons in 
individual cases159 but this is the exception rather than the rule.  Is this not a spectacular revelation 
in an age of public accountability?  The absence of a legal obligation to account frustrates public 
expectations of open and accountable decision-making, and places the law out of step with good 
administrative practice.   
 
It is remarkable that this lacuna should persist.  There is lacking a duty even where decision-makers 
must swear affidavits when their decisions are challenged in judicial review.  The duty of candour is a 
 
152 Joseph at [22.8.4]. See also M Taggart “Administrative Law [2006] NZ L Rev 75 at 82-98 (“all the colours of 
the rainbow”).  And see more generally M Taggart “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury” [2008] NZ L Rev 
423, and the several articles in response in [2010] NZ L Rev 229-431. 
153 Joseph at [22.8.4]-[22.8.5].  
154 PA Joseph “Exploratory Questions in Administrative Law” (2012) 25 NZULR 73 at 81-86. 
155 PA Joseph “Exploratory Questions in Administrative Law” (2012) 25 NZULR 73 at 85. 
156 Joseph at [[24.2]; PA Joseph “Exploratory Questions in Administrative Law” (2012) 25 NZULR 73 at 82.   
157 C v Medical Council of New Zealand [2013] NZHC 825, [2013] NZAR 712; Carroll v Auckland Coroner’s Court 
[2013] NZHC 906, [2013] NZAR 650 at [72]; McGuire v Wellington Standards Committee (No 1) [2014] NZHC 
3042 at [86].  I acknowledge there may be other such decisions of which I am unaware.   
158 See for example R v Awatere [1982] 1 NZLR 644 (CA) at 646-647; Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 
546 (CA) at [75]; Manukau Golf Club Inc v Shoye Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 109, [2013] 1 NZLR 305 at [16]. See 
Joseph at [25.4.11(1)n 481] for a more extensive list of citations. 
159 See for example Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546 (CA). 
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public responsibility, not a legally compellable obligation.160  The only sanction for a failure to give 
reasons is the drawing of adverse inferences when decisions are challenged.  A court might conclude 
that a decision was unreasonable,161 or that it lacked an evidentiary foundation and was arbitrary,162 
or that mandatory relevant considerations were ignored or irrelevant ones relied upon.163  
 
The obligation to account is the fulcrum of modern public administration.  Parliament acknowledged 
this when it enacted the Official Information Act 1982.  A government department, minister or 
public organisation that is subject to the Act must provide reasons on request for a decision affecting 
an individual.164  A general common law duty to provide reasons would not impose a burdensome 
obligation.165  The duty would be of variable strength, depending on the decision-making.  The 
Canadian courts have held that the duty posits a flexible standard that leaves leeway for decision-
makers.166  The duty might range from a tick-box exercise for minor, low-level decision-making to an 
explanation of the cognitive processes of decision-making for decisions significantly affecting 
individuals.  The duty would be entirely contextual, taking account of the particular circumstances of 
the decision-making.  
 
(iii) Unauthorised purposes 
 
The Court of Appeal decision in Attorney-General v Ireland167 laid down a principle that controverts 
our basic understanding of public accountability.  It established that decision-makers exercising 
statutory powers may properly pursue purposes that Parliament had not authorised.  Unauthorised 
purposes will not vitiate the exercise of power, as long as their pursuit does not impede 
achievement of the authorised purpose.   
 
 
160 New Zealand Fishing Industry Association Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1988] 1 NZLR 544 (CA) 
at 554,562 and 567-568; Minister of Energy v Petroleum Exploration Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 348 (CA) at 352; Inder v 
Commissioner of Crown Lands HC Christchurch CIV-2009-409-1219, 28 May 2010 at [30].  
161 See Zhang v Minister of Immigration [2013] NZHC 790 at [28].  
162 New Zealand Fishing Industry Association Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1988] 1 NZLR 544 (CA) 
at 554; R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Lonrho plc [1989] 1 WLR 525 (HL) at 539-540; 
Zhang v Minister of Immigration [2013] NZHC 790 at [28].  
163 See Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 977 (HL) at 1061-1062; Fiordland 
Venison Ltd v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1978] 2 NZLR 341 (CA) 345-346; Raceway Motors Ltd v 
Canterbury Regional Planning Authority [1976] 2 NZLR 605 (SC) at 612; Leiataua v Minister of Immigration HC 
Wellington CIV-2003-485-742, 26 November 2003.   
164 Official Information Act 1982, s 23. 
165 Joseph at [25.4.11(2)]. 
166 Baker v Canada [1999] SCR 817. 
167 Attorney-General v Ireland [2002] 2 NZLR 220 (CA).  
26 
 
Ireland swims against the tide.  Modern-day administrative law advocates a strengthening of public 
law disciplines, not a weakening of them.168  Unauthorised purposes cannot be condoned.  If 
Parliament had intended a decision-maker to pursue additional (that is, unauthorised) purposes, it 
would or could have provided so.  Discretionary powers must be exercised so as to promote the 
statutory purpose(s),169 not pursue ulterior agenda.  The courts have rejected any notion of an 
unfettered power and affirmed that all public powers have legal limits which circumscribe and 
control the exercise of power.170  Unauthorised purposes are an alien concept.  
 
No analogy may be drawn to mandatory and permissible relevant considerations.171  Decision-
makers may properly have regard to considerations that are relevant to the decision-making, should 
they wish.  It falls to the decision-maker’s judgment whether or not to weigh such considerations in 
the exercise of discretion.  Permissible considerations are distinguished from mandatory relevant 
considerations, which decision-makers must take into account as a matter of legal obligation.172  
These considerations are set out in the enabling statute and must be factored into the exercise of 
discretion.173 
 
Unauthorised purposes are not analogous to permissible considerations.  Purposes are qualitatively 
different from considerations.  A purpose for acting is the primary motivation which permeates the 
entire action, whereas a permissible relevant consideration is merely one of potentially several 
considerations that may/may not affect the outcome of a decision.  No major adjustment was 
required for the courts to accommodate permissible relevant considerations, granting decision-
makers leeway.  The same cannot be said of the accommodation Ireland made for unauthorised 
purposes.  This concession significantly undermined the Padfield discipline,174 representing a major 
departure from established doctrine.  It was, in short, a wrong turning in the law.  Ireland signals a 
 
168 See for example Joseph at [22.2.4], [23.2.3(4)] for the courts’ insistence on intensive scrutiny of the 
cognitive processes of decision- making, when decision-makers must weigh mandated relevant considerations.  
Modern courts show no patience for “tick-box” decision-making.  
169 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL) at 1030, 1060; Wellington City 
Council v Woolworths (NZ) Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA) at 545; Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce 
Commission [2007] NZSC 74, [2008] 1 NZLR 42 at [53]. 
170 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL). 
171 For a contrary view see H Wilberg “The Ireland Principe for Multiple Purpose Cases: An Exploration and 
Defence”, Administrative Law in New Zealand, Auckland, 30 January 2015.  
172 CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 (CA) at 183. 
173 Compare Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188 (HC) (a mandatory 
relevant consideration arose by implication of the decision-making and its effect on sectional interests). 
174 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL) (all public powers must be 
exercised so as to promote the statutory purpose). 
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retreat from modern standards of public accountability and should be revisited at the earliest 
opportunity.   
 
(iv) The bias rules 
 
Fortunately, we can now put this sorry tale of the law behind us.  The Saxmere litigation brought to 
an end the confusion that had beset the bias rules in administrative law.  This episode exemplifies 
how the law may suffer when courts make imprudent changes that require downstream remedial 
action.  
 
Traditionally, bias allegations were assessed through the eyes of the hypothetical lay observer, who 
was fully informed and impartial.175  This test gave proper weight to maintaining public confidence in 
the impartial administration of justice.   Then, the House of Lords jettisoned the objective test and 
assessed bias allegations through the eyes of the presiding judge, who personified the fair-minded 
lay observer.176  Our courts uncritically followed suit and likewise jettisoned the objective test in 
preference for the English approach.177  But the story then took an unexpected twist.  The subjective 
test was incompatible with European law,178 so the House of Lords reinstated the objective test 
based on the fair-minded lay observer.179  This left New Zealand alone among the common law 
jurisdictions applying the discredited subjective test. 
 
The law was betwixt and between.  For several years, there followed incessant toing-and-froing 
between differently constituted panels of the Court of Appeal.  It was an unedifying spectacle, with 
some panels of the Court affirming the subjective test,180 and others championing the objective 
test.181  To everyone’s relief, Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd (No 1)182 finally 
brought an end to the confusion.  The Supreme Court endorsed the English development and 
reinstated the objective test, premised on the hypothetical “fair-minded lay observer”: Would that 
person reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the 
 
175 Royal Commission on Thomas Case [1982] 1 NZLR 252 (CA).  The relevant authorities are collated in Joseph 
at [25.5.4]. 
176 R v Gough [1993] AC 646 (HL).  
177 Auckland Casino Ltd v Casino Control Authority [1995] 1 NZLR 142 (CA). 
178 Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 (CA) at [35]; Porter v Magill [2001] 
UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357 at [103]. 
179 Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357. 
180 R v Jessop CA13/00, 19 December 2005; Lamb v Massey University CA241/04, 13 July 2006.  
181 Ngati Tahinga and Ngati Karewa Trust v Attorney-General (2003) 16 PRNZ 878 (CA); Erris Promotions Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2003) 16 PRNZ 1014 (CA).  




decision-making?183  The law had turned full circle but it was a journey that should never have been 
embarked upon.       
 
F Conclusion  
 
The principal burden of this article has been to expose the false dichotomies that compromised 
judicial review during the middle years of last century.  The period from the immediate post-war 
years to the present offers a fascinating window of legal change.  Different mind-sets from today 
were at play following the executive-fixated war years.  Wartime measures had fostered attitudes of 
judicial deference that lingered for many years, until changing social expectations began raising the 
temperature and energising the courts.  The legal power-plays under the dichotomies that defined 
judicial review were enervating, diverting attention away from administrative wrongdoing.  The stark 
binary choices were distractions that were unresponsive to the high public interest in promoting 
public accountability. 
 
That period has now passed.  Three macro-developments characterise post-war judicial review: the 
shift away from a priori labels in administrative law (jurisdictional/non-jurisdictional, 
judicial/administrative, void/voidable, etc), the broadening of the grounds under which the courts 
might quash decisions, and the resolve to avoid doctrinal complexity.184  Robin Cooke’s struggle for 
simplicity represents the best defence against slippage into the world of tabulated legalism.  He 
pioneered the ideal of simple, untechnical and prompt proceedings, unencumbered by doctrinal 
issues.  Yet, the need for vigilance remains.  The vagaries of litigation will continue to test the courts, 
which must mind-wrestle complex issues and reconcile public and private interests.  They are not 
immune from taking wrong turnings in the law, as when they condoned unauthorised purposes in 
public decision-making and the absence of a duty to provide reasons for decisions.  The courts have 
acknowledged that these two issues will need to be addressed.185  Happily, they have repaired the 
damage they inflicted on the bias rules but there remains one issue that no-one seems willing to 




183 Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd (No 1) [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 at [3], [89] 
and [127], following Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63, (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6] and [33]. 
184 Se Bugg v Director of Public Prosecutions [1993] 3 All ER 815 (DC) at 820-822 per Woolf LJ. 
185 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 564 (CA) at [85] (on the “duty” to give reasons); Criminal Bar 






             
 





    
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
